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Abstract—This communication deals with fault-injection in-
duced by a source of radiated electromagnetic field at near-field
distance of a microcontroller. We show that software execution
is altered at targeted instructions if the radiating probe is
located above the phase-locked loop device driving the clock
tree. Furthermore, the fault-injection rate is analyzed for a
pulse-modulated sine wave. The higher rate is obtained within a
frequency range that likely corresponds to the upper spectrum
associated to the rate of change of voltages / currents of the
microcontroller associated with its semiconductor technology.
Index Terms—fault-injection, near-field, radiated immunity
I. INTRODUCTION
Fault injection is a classical technique used since the 60’s.
The original aim was to simulate the cosmic radiation and its
effects on the embedded equipment in a space environment [1].
Using such a technique to attack cryptographic algorithms has
been proposed in 1997 by Biham et al. [2] and by Boneh et
al. [3].
Four different methods are commonly used to make fault
injection. Firstly laser injection may be used. It requires to
accurately point a laser on a precise location on the chip
but allows a great control of the induced perturbation on
the device, with the possibility in some cases to choose the
transistor to pertubate. This is an invasive attack that requires
the exposure of the silicon part of the chip. Secondly, direct
injection of electrical perturbation within the circuit may be
achieved. This technique is free of all coupling problems but
requires direct access on the board to the electric lines which
is hard to obtain without damaging the hardware. Moreover,
this way of injection is far less precise, the perturbation effect
is global. Thirdly, the clock glitch is a way to disturb circuit
behaviour through the clock line. It can be realized by chang-
ing the duration of one clock period. This technique requires
an access to the clock signal. Fourthly, the electromagnetic
injection (EMI), which is the topic of this work, is a non-
invasive way of attacking the chip.
In case of EMI, an electromagnetic probe is placed at close
proximity of the chip (in the reactive near-field range), and a
signal is generated at the precise time where a fault is desired.
Moreover, the spatial location of the probe above the chip is
crucial. The nature of the electromagnetic waveform plays a
key role for the efficiency of the attack. The common param-
eter of all the previous physical attack techniques remains the
need for timing accuracy of the disruptive emission in order
to target the critical software instruction.
The rate of success of a fault injection can be crucial for
an effective attack for two reasons: first, every injection is a
risk for the attacker to be detected by some countermeasures.
Second, in a personal identification number (PIN) code attack
for example, the attacker has only three attempts to provide
the right key, so every try has to be exploited for the attack.
This communication proposes several ways to improve the
success rate of fault injection by electromagnetic radiation.
The test bench used for those tests is described in section II.
In section IV, explanations on the preferred location for an effi-
cient EMI are given presuming on the phase-locked loop (PLL)
high susceptibility to that disruption, proven in section III.
Finally, through a parametric analysis on the waveform, key
parameters are highlighted to optimize the injection efficiency.
II. TEST BENCH DESCRIPTION
A. Hardware
Fig. 1: Test bench for fault attacks by electromagnetic injec-
tion.
The targeted microcontroller is the STM32F100RB, embed-
ding an ARM-cortex-M3 core running at 24MHz. The test-
bench (Figure 1) is composed of a generation chain with a
Keysight 33509B pulse generator, a Keysight 81160A signal
generator and a Milmega 80RF1000-175 power amplifier. The
so produced signal, with high power, is radiated through a
Langer R0.3-3 probe located just above the surface of the
chip.
The communication between the computer and the appli-
cation on the chip is realized by a UART (Universal Asyn-
chronous Receiver Transmitter) connection. The JTAG (Joint
Test Action Group) interface ensures the debug access on the
board and allows to upload the firmware.
B. Software
The targeted firmware, uploaded on the chip for the exper-
iments, send a signal on an output pin of the board to trigger
the injection. The clock signal is outed on another pin of the
board and displayed on the oscilloscope. This firmware is a
dedicated program where a single instruction, the one under
investigation, is isolated to ensure no side effect.
Listing 1: Assembly code for the targeted instruction
asm ldr :
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
ldr R2 , [ R0 , # 4 ] ; / * load va l u e i n R2 from th e add r e s s R0+4*/
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
mov R0 , R2 ; / * copy R2 i n R0 , o u t p u t o f t h e f u n c t i o n * /
bx l r
The software managing the testbench communicates with
the two generators to monitor the delay and the shape of
the injected signal. These capabilities make parametric study
possible and enable us to find optimized parameterization for
the injection.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PLL AS A VULNERABLE
DEVICE WITH REGARD TO RADIATED IMMUNITY
PLL are well known components designed to produce stabi-
lized clock signals for receiving systems and microcontroller
chips. Classically PLL are composed of a voltage controlled
oscillator (VCO) which provides the clock signal, a frequency
divider, a filter, a reference signal (classically a crystal), and a
phase comparator. Since the clock signal is distributed in the
whole system, its distortion could affect every part of the chip
and induce errors during data processing.
It has been previously demonstrated that PLLs become
unstable in presence of EMI [4]. Exposure to strong elec-
tromagnetic waves can cause sub-harmonic oscillations [5],
[6]. More specifically, such an EMI can cause amplitude
modulation of the voltage control of the VCO, inducing phase
modulation of the VCO output.
In the specific case of a microchip, EMI provokes clock
glitches. In Figure 2 (a), the normal clock signal is pictured
(a) and two captures of the clock signal when a fault occurs
are presented in Figure 2 (b) and (c). This outline the strong
influence of an EMI on the clock signal for one cycle and
advance the global timing of a half clock period. In Figure 2
(b), the beginning of a clock edge appears but suddenly goes
back to the low state instead of reaching the high state. We
assume it enables to activate part of the circuit but not the
whole chip. In Figure 2 (c), a clock edge does not appear. If
the edge had just been deleted, there would be no fault, just a
(a) Clock signal without fault
(b) Clock signal with fault: starting edge
(c) Clock signal with fault: no edge
Fig. 2: Normal clock signal (a) vs faulted clock signals (b)
and (c).
delay on the global timing of the software. As there is a fault,
we can assume that in some part of the clock tree, an edge is
present and sufficiently perceptible to induce a software effect.
Listing 2: Interpreted code for Pin verification.
i f ( myP in I sVe r i f i e d ( ) )
t h e n{
/ / d o s ome th i ng s e c u r e l y
t e s t =1 ;}
e l s e{
t e s t =0 ; / / t h r o w e x c e p t i o n c o n d i t i o n n o t s a t i s f i e d}
Listing 3: Assembly code for Pin verification.
80004b6 : f000 f 8 a e b l 8000616 <myP in I sVe r i f i e d>
80004 ba : 4603 mov r3 , r0 / *move o u t p u t t o R3* /
80004 bc : 2b00 cmp r3 , #0 / * compare R3 to 0* /
80004 be : d003 beq.n 80004 c8 <main+0x218> / * b ranch i f
→֒ unequa l * /
80004 c0 : 4b24 l d r r3 , [ pc , #144] ; (8000554 <main+0x2a4>)
80004 c2 : 2201 movs r2 , #1
80004 c4 : 601 a s t r r2 , [ r3 , #0 ] / * s t o r e v a l u e * /
80004 c6 : e002 b.n 80004 ce <main+0x21e> / * b ranch * /
80004 c8 : 4b22 l d r r3 , [ pc , #136] ; (8000554 <main+0x2a4>)
80004 ca : 2200 movs r2 , #0
80004 cc : 601 a s t r r2 , [ r3 , #0 ]
Listing 4: Interpreted code for faulted Pin verification.
/ / d o s ome th i ng s e c u r e l y
t e s t =1 ;}
Such a disruption can provoke a fault or a crash in the
software. A fault happens when a part of the program is in
an unexpected state but still runs. A crash happens when
the disruption leads the program to an exception branch or
requires it to be reset.
In the software point of view, it can induce a virtual nop. In
fact, the EMI induces an uncontrolled alteration in the opcode
which is the binary value of the instruction. The opcode of
the targeted instruction (LDR in the example in Listing 1) is
changed in the opcode of another instruction which most of
the time has no side-effect [7]. Thus the effect is the same as
if the targeted instruction had been replaced by a nop. This
action produces wrong values on the output of the function.
In some specific cases, the attack can corrupt data while it is
loaded in a register.
Skipping an instruction can be useful for example to bypass
a code pin verification [8] or to evaluate the current status as
shown in Listing 2. Such a code fragment is essentially an
if...then...else structure. The corresponding assembly code is
given in Listing 3. In the normal case, output of myPinIsVer-
ified function is tested. If it is True, the variable test is set to
1, if not the variable test is set to 0. In case of fault on the
conditional branch instruction (in blue) the pin is considered as
correct and the red part of the code is executed automatically
with no condition. Thus the verification is bypassed as shown
in Listing 4.
A. Success rate of fault-injection vs probe position
Considering the PLL vulnerability to the EMI and the
effects of a fault injection on the clock signal, we assume
that the PLL is the sensitive part of the chip.
Mapping of injection efficiency has been realized on the
chip. The probe is moved with steps of 0.5mm above the
surface of the chip. For each position 1000 EMI are achieved.
The injected signal is a pulse modulated sinusoidal wave of 4
periods at 275MHz frequency. The delay of injection is fixed
and equal to 188.5ns. The phase is explored with a step of
20°. The best results for each location have been chosen for
the plot in Figure 3. The hypothesis of a fix delay is due to the
stability of the injection efficiency on a range of 5 ns around
that delay value (see section IV).
Comparing the most susceptible location to EMI to the pins
mapping of the chip, this location is correlated to the Vssa and
Vdda pins used to feed analog peripheral. In particular, these
signals feed the PLL.
Finally, when the PLL is disabled and the chip clock is
directly plugged to the crystal, the fault rate induced by EMI
is close to zero. Considering all those results, we confirm
that the PLL is a vulnerable device to EMI within such a
microcontrolller. Knowing this, the location of the probe for
the attack can be reduced to an area around pins linked to the
PLL.
IV. PARAMETRIC INFLUENCE OF THE WAVEFORM
A. Method of analysis
As the fault rate is essential for the success of a physical
attack, optimization of injection parameters has been inves-
tigated. First of all, the dwell time of the injected signal
must be strictly restricted so that the fault is limited to
a single instruction. Second, we select a pulsed sinusoidal
wave with moderate bandwidth rather than wideband pulses.
Especially, the waveform is a pulse modulated sinus of 4
periods parameterized by three main criteria: the frequency,
the delay of injection and the starting phase of that sinus.
For these parametric studies, the location for the probe has
been chosen in the most sensitive area (x=0.05mm, y=6mm).
Seven frequency values are tested from 250MHz to 300MHz.
(a) Fault rate (%) mapping
(b) PIN in/out mapping
Fig. 3: Comparison of fault injection mapping with
STM32F100RB-LQFP64 PIN map.
Injection delay goes from 180ns to 195ns and the phase
value is explored with a 20° step. In order to monitor the
injection, one of the board pin is set to high state to start
the injection. The time at which the EM near-field reaches
the microcontroller is delayed with regard to the triggering
signal. It mainly corresponds to the propagation delay within
the hardware including the generator, amplifier and coaxial
cables. Induced currents and voltages are only due to reactive
near-field coupling with the probe The delay of injection
as spoken in this section is the complementary delay added
to the hardware intrinsic delay due to generators, amplifiers
and wires. This additional delay is used to target precisely
the instruction we want to disrupt. In Figure 4, the gain
of the probe is plotted with respect to the frequency. This
gain increases fastly from 0MHz to 500MHz and reaches its
maximum -30 dB for a frequency of 1.5GHz. So the probe
is used in the low range of its bandwidth.
B. Results
In Figure 5, the fault rate is plotted with respect to the
frequency of the EMI. Only the best fault rate for every fre-
quency is considered (among all (delay;phase) couples). The
consequence of the fault is a nop on the LDR instruction. The
fault rate start increasing till 270MHz. Then the maximum
fault rate achieved with this configuration is 20%. It can be
observed that there is a bandwidth from 270MHz to 290MHz
Fig. 4: Probe gain with respect to the frequency.
where the fault rate is maximum. Over 290MHz, the fault
rate decreases rapidly. On the one hand, the electromagnetic
coupling increases linearly with frequency together with the
probe gain. On the other hand, the limited bandwidth of the
chip prevents high frequency propagation. Rising and falling
time of the clock signal are 1.7 ns and 1.5 ns, respectively.
The first cut-off frequency is around 206MHz. The spectral
envelope above this frequency decays with 20 dB per decade
until it reaches 233MHz and then decays with 40 dB / dec.
We may therefore suppose that the increasing level of induced
signal is overcompensated once the frequency is well above
233MHz.
Fig. 5: Fault rate on LDR instruction with respect to the
injection frequency.
In Figure 6, fault rate is plotted with respect to the injection
delay. The frequency of injection is 275MHz and only the
best fault rate for every delay value is considered (among
the result for every phase value). Fault rate success increases
progressively between 182ns and 185ns of delay to reach
the maximum of 20% of fault. The fault rate is stable from
185ns up to 193ns and then decreases. For an injection of
15 ns duration (4 periods of a 275MHz sinusoidal wave), a
precision of 5 ns is expected in order to inject with the most
probable fault success.
V. CONCLUSION
Electromagnetic injection is a non-invasive way to attack
a chip. The large number of parameters that require to be
properly tuned for such an attack limits its efficiency. In a
first step, the PLL has been identified as a sensitive part of
Fig. 6: Fault rate on LDR instruction with respect to the
injection delay.
the chip. As a result, the preferential location for the EMI is
reduced to a small area in the vicinity of the analog power
supply feeding the PLL. In a second step, the influence of
the frequency of the injected electromagnetic wave has been
explored. The optimal fault rate is achieved in a bandwidth
of 15MHz, in the upper limit of the chip bandwidth. Then, it
has been shown that for an optimal frequency that a precision
of 5 ns is expected to reach the best fault rate. With this EMI
technique, the achieved success rate reaches 15 to 20%. Such
a fault can be used to retrieve the key of an cryptographic
algorithm (for an Advanced Encryption Standard application
for example [9]).
In further works, a deeper analysis of the PLL sensitivity
could be realized. Having a better understanding of the real
mechanism of such a disruption could lead to proposals for
countermeasures to EMI on PLL to protect microcontrollers.
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